



1 “Article VI. Section 3.  Controls
of capital transfers:  Members
may exercise such controls as
are necessary to regulate inter-
national capital movements,
but no member may exercise
these controls in a manner
which will restrict payments for
current transactions or which
will unduly delay transfers of
funds in settlement of commit-
ments, except as provided in
Article VII, Section 3(b) and in





Moreover, it may well be asked whether
we can take it for granted that a return 
to freedom of exchanges is really a ques-
tion of time.  Even if the reply were in the
afﬁrmative, it is safe to assume that after 
a period of freedom the regime of control
will be restored as a result of the next 
economic crisis.
—Paul Einzig, Exchange Control,
MacMillan and Company, 1934.
Currency controls are a risky, stopgap
measure, but some gaps desperately 
need to be stopped.
—Paul Krugman, “Free Advice:  
A Letter to Malaysia’s Prime Minister,”
Fortune, September 28, 1998.
U
nlike many topics in international eco-
nomics, capital controls—taxes or
restrictions on international transac-
tions in assets like stocks or bonds—have
received cursory treatment in textbooks and
scant attention from researchers.  The con-
sensus among economists has been that cap-
ital controls—like tariffs on goods—are
obviously detrimental to economic efﬁciency
because they prevent productive resources
from being used where they are most need-
ed.  As a result, capital controls gradually
had been phased out in developed countries
during the 1970s and 1980s, and by the
1990s there was substantial pressure on less-
developed countries to remove their restric-
tions, too (New York Times, 1999).  The topic
almost had been relegated to a curiosity.
Several recent developments, however,
have rekindled interest in the use and
study of capital controls.  First, the resump-
tion of large capital ﬂows—trade in assets—
to developing countries during the late
1980s and early 1990s created new prob-
lems for policymakers.  Second, a string of
exchange rate/ﬁnancial crises during the
1990s—the European Monetary System
crises of 1992-93, the Mexican crisis of
1994 and the Asian ﬁnancial crisis of
1997-98—focused attention on the asset
transactions that precipitated them.  In
particular, Malaysia’s adoption of capital
controls on September 1, 1998, has
prompted increased media attention and
has renewed debate on the topic.  
Modern capital controls were devel-
oped by the belligerents in World War I 
to maintain a tax base to ﬁnance wartime
expenditures.  Controls began to disappear
after the war, only to return during the
Great Depression of the 1930s.  At that
time, their purpose was to permit coun-
tries greater ability to reﬂate their econo-
mies without the danger of capital ﬂight.
In fact, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) Articles of Agreement (Article VI,
section 3) signed at the Bretton-Woods
conference in 1944 explicitly permitted
capital controls.1 One of the architects of
those articles, John Maynard Keynes, was 
a strong proponent of capital controls and
the IMF often was seen as such during its
early years.  During the Bretton-Woods era
of ﬁxed-exchange rates, many countries
limited asset transactions to cope with bal-
ance-of-payments difﬁculties.  But, recog-
nition of the costs and distortions created
by these restrictions led to their gradual
removal in developed countries over the
last 30 years.  The United States, for exam-
ple, removed its most prominent capital
controls in 1974 (Congressional Quarterly
Service, 1977).  During the last 10 years
even less-developed countries began to 
liberalize trade in assets.
The purpose of this article is to intro-
duce Review readers to the debate on capi-
tal controls, to explain the purposes 
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2 The U.S. Department of
Commerce does not recognize
“real” assets as a separate
class. The purchase of assets
such as foreign production facili-
ties is recorded under ﬁnancial
assets in their accounts
(Department of Commerce,
1990). 
3 The capital account records
both loans and asset purchases
because both involve buying a
claim on future income.  A
bank making a car loan obtains
a legal claim on the borrower’s
future income.
4 Equity investment is considered
portfolio investment in national
accounts until it exceeds 10
percent of the market capital-
ization of the ﬁrm, then it is
considered direct investment.  
5 The current accountrecords
trade in goods, services, and
unilateral transfers.  A nation’s
capital account balance must
be equal to and opposite in
sign from its current account
balance because a nation that
imports more goods and ser-
vices than it exports must pay
for those extra imports by sell-
ing assets or borrowing money.
The sum of the current account
balance and the capital account
balance is the balance of pay-
ments.  
6 The composition as well as the
magnitude of capital ﬂows also
may inﬂuence the sustainability
of policies, as will be discussed
in section 3.  
and costs of controls and why some advo-
cate their reintroduction.  To lay the ground-
work for understanding restrictions on
capital ﬂows, the next section of the article
describes capital ﬂows and their beneﬁts.
The third section characterizes the most
common objectives of capital controls with
an emphasis on the recent debate about
using controls to foster macroeconomic
stability.  Then the many types of capital
controls are distinguished from each other
and their effectiveness and costs are con-
sidered.  In addition, accompanying shad-
ed inserts outline speciﬁc case studies in
capital controls:  the U.S. Interest Equali-
zation Tax of 1963, the Chilean encajeof
the 1990s, and the restrictions imposed 
by Malaysia in September 1998.  
CAPITAL FLOWS
To understand what capital controls do,
it is useful to examine capital ﬂows—trade
in real and ﬁnancial assets.  International
purchases and sales of existing real and
ﬁnancial assets are recorded in the capital
account of the balance of payments.2 Real
assets include production facilities and real
estate while ﬁnancial assets include stocks,
bonds, loans, and claims to bank deposits.3
Capital account transactions often are classi-
ﬁed into portfolio investment and direct
investment.  Portfolio investment encom-
passes trade in securities like stocks, bonds,
bank loans, derivatives, and various forms
of credit (commercial, ﬁnancial, guaran-
tees).  Direct investment involves the pur-
chase of real estate, production facilities,
or substantial equity investment.4 When a
German corporation, BMW, for example,
builds an automobile factory in South
Carolina, that is direct investment.  On the
other hand, when U.S. investors buy
Mexican government bonds, that is portfo-
lio investment.
A country is said to have a deﬁcit in
the capital account if it is accumulating net
claims on the rest of the world by purchas-
ing more assets and/or making more loans
to the rest of the world than it is receiving.
A country, like Japan, with a capital account
deﬁcit is also said to experience a capital
outﬂow.  Accumulating claims on the rest
of the world is a form of national saving.
Conversely, a country is said to have a sur-
plus in the capital account—or a capital
inﬂow—if the rest of the world is accumu-
lating net claims on it, as is the case with
the United States.5 Just as individuals
must avoid borrowing excessively, policy-
makers must make sure that the rest of the
world does not accumulate too many net
claims on their countries—in other words,
that their countries do not sell assets/bor-
row at an unsustainable rate.6
Beneﬁts of Capital Flows
Economists have long argued that
trade in assets (capital ﬂows) provides 
substantial economic beneﬁts by enabling
residents of different countries to capitalize
on their differences.  Fundamentally, capi-
tal ﬂows permit nations to trade consump-
tion today for consumption in the future—
to engage in intertemporal trade (Eichen-
green, et al. 1999).  Because Japan has a
population that is aging more rapidly than
that of the United States, it makes sense
for Japanese residents to purchase more
U.S. assets than they sell to us.  This allows
the Japanese to save for their retirement by
building up claims on future income in the
United States while permitting residents of
the United States to borrow at lower inter-
est rates than they could otherwise pay.  
A closely related concept is that capital
ﬂows permit countries to avoid large falls
in national consumption from economic
downturn or natural disaster by selling
assets to and/or borrowing from the rest of
the world.  For example, after an earth-
quake devastated southern Italy on Novem-
ber 23, 1980, leaving 4,800 people dead,
Italians borrowed from abroad (ran a capi-
tal account surplus) to help repair the
damage.  Figure 1 illustrates the time
series of the Italian capital account from
1975 through 1985.  
A third beneﬁt is that capital ﬂows
permit countries as a whole to borrow in
order to improve their ability to produce
goods and services in the future—like
individuals borrowing to ﬁnance an educa-NOVEMBER/DECEMBER1999
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7 Alesina, Grilli, and Milesi-
Ferretti (1994) and Grilli and
Milesi-Ferretti (1995) empiri-
cally examine factors associat-
ed with capital controls.
tion.  To cite just one example, between
1960 and 1980 Koreans borrowed funds from
the rest of the world equal to about 4.3
percent of gross domestic product (GDP)
annually to ﬁnance investment during Korea’s
period of very strong growth (see Figure 2).
These arguments for free capital mobili-
ty are similar to those that are used to sup-
port free trade.  Countries with different age
structures, saving rates, opportunities for
investment, or risk proﬁles can beneﬁt from
trade in assets.  More recently, economists
have emphasized other beneﬁts of capital
ﬂows such as the technology transfer that
often accompanies foreign investment, or
the greater competition in domestic mar-
kets that results from permitting foreign
ﬁrms to invest locally (Eichengreen, et al.
1999).  The beneﬁts of capital ﬂows do not
come without a price, however.  Because
capital ﬂows can complicate economic poli-
cy or even be a source of instability them-
selves, governments have used capital




A capital control is any policy
designed to limit or redirect capital
account transactions.  This broad deﬁni-
tion suggests that it will be difﬁcult to gen-
eralize about capital controls because they
can take many forms and may be applied
for various purposes (Bakker, 1996).
Controls may take the form of taxes, price
or quantity controls, or outright prohibi-
tions on international trade in assets.7
Revenue Generation and 
Credit Allocation
The ﬁrst widespread capital controls
were adopted in WWI as a method to
ﬁnance the war effort.  At the start of the
war, all the major powers suspended their
participation in the gold standard for the
duration of the conﬂict but maintained
ﬁxed-exchange rates.  All the belligerents
restricted capital outﬂows, the purchase of
foreign assets or loans abroad.  These
restrictions raised revenues in two ways.
First, by keeping capital in the domestic
economy, it facilitated the taxation of
wealth and interest income (Bakker, 1996).
Second, it permitted a higher inﬂation rate,
which generated more revenue.  Capital
controls also reduced interest rates and
therefore the government’s borrowing costs
on its own debt (Johnston and Tamirisa,
1998).  Since WWI, controls on capital
outﬂows have been used similarly in other
—mostly developing—economies to gen-
erate revenue for governments or to permit
them to allocate credit domestically with-
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Correct a Balance of
Payments Deﬁcit
















Controls on capital outﬂows permit a country to run
higher inﬂation with a given ﬁxed-exchange rate and
also hold down domestic interest rates.
Governments that use the ﬁnancial system to reward
favored industries or to raise revenue, may use capital
controls to prevent capital from going abroad to seek
higher returns.
Controls on outﬂows reduce demand for foreign assets
without contractionary monetary policy or devalua-
tion. This allows a higher rate of inﬂation than other-
wise would be possible.
Controls on inﬂows reduce foreign demand for domes-
tic assets without expansionary monetary policy or
revaluation. This allows a lower rate of inﬂation than
would otherwise be possible.
Restricting inﬂows enhances macroeconomic stability
by reducing the pool of capital that can leave a coun-
try during a crisis.
Capital controls can restrict or change the composition
of international capital ﬂows that can exacerbate dis-
torted incentives in the domestic ﬁnancial system.
Restricting inﬂows prevents the necessity of monetary
expansion and greater domestic inﬂation that would
cause a real appreciation of the currency.
Foreign ownership of certain domestic assets—espe-
cially natural resources—can generate resentment.
The beneﬁts of investing in the domestic economy 
may not fully accrue to savers so the economy, as 
a whole, can be made better off by restricting the 
outﬂow of capital.
Controls that temporarily segregate domestic ﬁnancial
sectors from the rest of the world may permit domestic
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Tamirisa).  Table 1 summarizes the pur-
poses of capital controls.
Balance of Payments Crises
During the Great Depression, controls
simultaneously were used to achieve greater
freedom for monetary policy and exchange
rate stability—goals that have remained
popular.  To understand why controls have
been used in this way, it is necessary to
understand balance of payments problems
and their solutions (Johnston and Tamirisa,
1998).  At a given exchange rate, a country
often will want to collectively purchase more
goods, services and assets than the rest of
the world will buy from it.  Such an imbal-
ance is called a balance of payments deﬁcit
and may come about for any one of a number
of reasons: 1) The domestic business cycle
may be out of sync with that of the rest of
the world; 2) There may have been a rapid
change in the world price of key com-
modities like oil; 3) Expansionary domes-
tic policy may have increased demand for
the rest of the world’s goods; 4) Large for-
eign debt interest obligations may surpass
the value of the domestic economy’s exports;
5) Or, a perception of deteriorating eco-
nomic policy may have reduced interna-
tional demand for domestic assets.8 In the
absence of some combination of exchange
rate and monetary policy by the deﬁcit
country, excess demand for foreign goods
and assets would bid up their prices—typi-
cally through a fall in the foreign exchange
value (a devaluation or depreciation) of 
the domestic currency—until the deﬁcit
was eliminated.9
There are four policy alternatives to
correct an imbalance in international pay-
ments: 1) Permit the exchange rate to
change, as described above; 2) Use mone-
tary policy—unsterilized foreign exchange
intervention—to correct the imbalance
through domestic demand; 3) Attempt to
sterilize the monetary changes to isolate
the domestic economy from the capital
ﬂows; and 4) Restrict capital ﬂows.10
Each alternative has disadvantages.
When domestic residents purchase
more goods and assets from foreigners
than foreigners purchase from domestic
residents, the exchange rate (the price of
foreign currency) tends to rise.  If the
exchange rate is ﬂexible, the foreign cur-
rency tends to appreciate and the domestic
currency tends to depreciate.  The depreci-
ation of the domestic currency raises prices
of imported goods and assets to domestic
residents and lowers the prices of domestic
goods and assets on world markets, reduc-
ing the relative demand for foreign goods
and assets until the imbalance in the bal-
ance of payments is eliminated.  A country
with a ﬁxed exchange rate similarly may
correct a balance of payments deﬁcit by
changing the exchange rate peg—devalu-
ing the currency—but this option foregoes
the beneﬁts of exchange rate stability for
international trade and policy discipline.
In addition, it may reduce the public’s con-
ﬁdence in the monetary authorities’ anti-
inﬂation program.  
If a government is committed to main-
taining a particular ﬁxed exchange rate, on
the other hand, its central bank can pre-
vent the depreciation of its currency with
contractionary monetary policy—by sell-
ing domestic bonds.11 Alternatively, the
central bank might sell foreign exchange
to affect the monetary base, in which case
the action is known as unsterilized foreign
exchange intervention.  In either case, such
a sale lowers the domestic money supply
and raises domestic interest rates—lower-
ing domestic demand for imports—while
reducing the prices of domestic goods, ser-
vices, and assets relative to their foreign
counterparts.  The reduced demand and
higher prices for foreign goods, services,
and assets would eliminate a balance of
payments deﬁcit.  However, this defense of
the exchange rate requires that monetary
policy be devoted solely to maintaining the
exchange rate; it cannot be used to achieve
independent domestic inﬂation or employ-
ment goals.  In this case, for example, the
contraction temporarily will reduce
domestic demand and employment, which
may be undesirable.  A country that uses
monetary policy to defend the exchange
rate in the face of imbalances in interna-
tional payments is said to subordinate
8 Often, the term “balance of
payments deﬁcit” describes an
imbalance in the current
account (goods, services, fac-
tor payments, and unilateral
transfers).  Here, it describes
the sum of the current account
and the capital account.
Countries also may demand
fewer goods and assets from
the rest of the world—balance
of payments surpluses—but
this article concentrates on bal-
ance of payments deﬁcits
because most countries ﬁnd
balance of payments surpluses
easier to manage. 
9 When a ﬂexible exchange rate
currency gains or loses value, it
is said to appreciate or depreci-
ate, respectively.  Fixed-rate
currencies are said to be reval-
ued or devalued when their
price rises or falls. 
10There are other policies—
ﬁscal and regulatory—that 
may be used to manage the
effects of capital ﬂows but they
will be ignored to simplify the
discussion. 
11Foreign exchange operations
that do not affect the domestic
monetary base are called “ster-
ilized,” while those that do
affect the monetary base are
called “unsterilized.”  Sales of
any asset would tend to lower
the domestic money supply and
raise interest rates because
when the monetary authority
receives payment for the asset,
the payment ceases to be part
of the money supply.  Fiscal
policy also may have an effect
on exchange rates but taxing
and spending decisions usually
are more constrained than
monetary decisions. domestic monetary policy to exchange 
rate concerns.
Rather than subordinate monetary pol-
icy to maintaining the exchange rate, some
central banks have attempted to recapture
some monetary independence by steriliz-
ing—or reversing—the effect of foreign
exchange operations on the domestic
money supply.  Sterilization of sales of for-
eign exchange (foreign bonds), for exam-
ple, would require the central bank to buy
an equal amount of domestic bonds, leav-
ing domestic interest rates unchanged after
the inﬂow.  It generally is believed that
sterilized intervention does not affect the
exchange rate and so it is not very effective
in recapturing monetary independence
(Edwards, 1998b).  
If international investors don’t believe
that the monetary authorities will defend
the exchange rate with tighter monetary
policy, they will expect devaluation—a fall
in the relative price of domestic goods and
assets—and will sell domestic assets to
avoid a loss.  Such a sale increases relative
demand for foreign assets, exacerbating
the balance of payments deﬁcit, and speeds
the devaluation.12
Capital ﬂows play a crucial role in bal-
ance of payments crises in two ways.
Swings in international capital ﬂows can
create both a balance-of-payments problem
and—if the exchange rate is not defend-
ed—expedite devaluation under ﬁxed-
exchange rates.  Thus, in the presence of
free capital ﬂows, a country wishing to
maintain a ﬁxed-exchange rate must use
monetary policy solely for that purpose.
As McKinnon and Oates (1966) argued, no
government can maintain ﬁxed-exchange
rates, free capital mobility, and have an
independent monetary policy; one of the
three options must give.  This is known as
the “incompatible trinity” or the trilemma
(Obstfeld and Taylor, 1998).  Policymakers
wishing to avoid exchange-rate ﬂuctuation
and retain scope for independent monetary
policy must choose the fourth option,
restrict capital ﬂows. 
By directly reducing demand for for-
eign assets and the potential for specula-
tion against the ﬁxed-exchange rate,
controls on capital outﬂows allow a coun-
try to maintain ﬁxed-exchange rates and
an independent domestic monetary policy
while alleviating a balance-of-payments
deﬁcit.13 The monetary authorities can
meet both their internal goals (employ-
ment and inﬂation) and their external
goals (balance of payments).14 Thus, capi-
tal controls are sometimes described in
terms of the choices they avoid: to prevent
capital outﬂows that, through their effect
on the balance of payments, might either
endanger ﬁxed-exchange rates or indepen-
dence of monetary policy.
Real Appreciation of the 
Exchange Rate
While capital outﬂows can create bal-
ance-of-payments deﬁcits, capital inﬂows
can cause real appreciation of the exchange
rate.15 During the 1980s and 1990s a
number of developing countries completed
important policy reforms that made them
much more attractive investment environ-
ments.  Eichengreen, et al. (1999) report
that net capital ﬂows to developing coun-
tries tripled from $50 billion in 1987-89 to
more than $150 billion in 1995-97.  These
large capital inﬂows to the reforming
countries tended to drive up the prices of
domestic assets.  For countries with ﬂexi-
ble exchange rates, the exchange rates
appreciated, raising the relative prices of
the domestic countries’ goods.  For coun-
tries with ﬁxed-exchange rates, the
increased demand for domestic assets led
the monetary authorities to buy foreign
exchange (sell domestic currency), increas-
ing the domestic money supply and ulti-
mately the prices of domestic goods and
assets.  In either case, the prices of domes-
tic goods and assets rose relative to those
in the rest of the world—a real apprecia-
tion—making domestic exported goods
less competitive on world markets and
hurting exporting and import-competing
industries.16 Because of these effects, the
problem of real exchange-rate appreciation
from capital inﬂows is described variously
as real exchange-rate instability, real appre-
ciation, or loss of competitiveness.
12Of course, capital outﬂows are
not necessary to force devalua-
tion.  If the domestic economy
still demands more goods and
services than it supplies to the
rest of the world, the exchange
rate cannot be maintained with-
out a monetary contraction.
13Countries that face balance of
payments surpluses—the
desire to purchase fewer goods
and services from the rest of
the world at the ﬁxed-exchange
rate—would restrict capital
inﬂows, rather than outﬂows,
to reduce demand for their own
assets.
14If there is still excess demand
for foreign goods, the ﬁxed-
exchange rate will still be only
temporarily sustainable.
15A nominal appreciation is a rise
in the foreign exchange value
of a country’s currency.  A real
appreciation is a rise in the rela-
tive price of domestic goods
and services compared to for-
eign goods and services.  This
may result from a nominal
appreciation, domestic inﬂation
that is higher than foreign inﬂa-
tion, or some combination of
the two. 
16Empirically, Edwards (1998b)
ﬁnds a consistent, but limited,
tendency toward real apprecia-
tion from capital inﬂows.
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options to prevent real appreciation in the
face of capital inﬂows (Goldstein, 1995;
Corbo and Hernandez, 1996).  Permitting
the exchange rate to change still results in
nominal and real appreciation but avoids
domestic inﬂation.  A very common tactic
for ﬁxed exchange-rate regimes is to steril-
ize the monetary effects of the inﬂows, pre-
venting an expansion of the money supply
by reversing the effect on the domestic
money market (Edwards, 1998b).  It gener-
ally is believed that sterilization is not very
effective in recapturing monetary indepen-
dence as it keeps domestic real interest
rates high and leads to continued inﬂows.
Sterilization of inﬂows also is a potentially
expensive strategy for the government as
the domestic bonds that the central bank
sells may pay higher interest than the for-
eign bonds the central bank buys.  Fiscal
contraction is an effective way to prevent
real appreciation because it lowers domes-
tic interest rates, and likewise, the demand
for domestic assets; but raising taxes and/or
reducing government spending may be
politically unpalatable.  Because of the
problems associated with these ﬁrst three
policies, countries like Brazil, Chile, and
Columbia chose to use capital controls—
restricting purchase of domestic assets
(inﬂows)—to try to prevent real apprecia-
tion and substitute for ﬁscal policy ﬂexibil-
ity in the face of heavy inﬂows.
Theories of the Second Best
More recently, economists have con-
sidered other circumstances—other than
balance-of-payments needs or real appreci-
ation—under which capital controls might
be a useful policy.  As a rule, economists
emphasize that restrictions on trade and
investment impose costs on the economy.
There are exceptions to that rule, however.
Taxes and quantitative restrictions may be
good for the economy—welfare improving,
in technical jargon—if they are used to
correct some other, pre-existing distortion
to free markets that cannot be corrected
otherwise.  The idea that a tax or quantita-
tive restriction can improve economic wel-
fare in this way is called a “theory of the
second best.”17
Capital controls preserve domestic
savings for domestic use.  From a national
point of view, there might be beneﬁts from
a greater rate of domestic investment that
do not fully accrue to the investors.  For
example, domestic savers might invest dis-
proportionately overseas because of politi-
cal risk of expropriation or a desire to
escape taxation.  In either case, the nation
as a whole could be made better off by lim-
iting or taxing domestic investment abroad
(Harberger, 1986).
The infant industry argument—an old
idea often used to justify tariffs in goods
markets —has been resurrected to ratio-
nalize the use of capital controls on both
inﬂows and outﬂows.  This idea starts with
the premise that small, domestic ﬁrms are
less efﬁcient than larger, foreign ﬁrms and
so will be unable to compete on an equal
basis.  To permit small domestic ﬁrms to
grow to the efﬁcient scale that they need to
enjoy to compete in world markets, they
must be protected temporarily from inter-
national competition by trade barriers.  As
applied to capital markets, the argument
urges that capital controls be used to protect
underdeveloped ﬁnancial markets from
foreign competition.  The problem with
this argument, as in goods markets, is that
protected industries often never grow up
and end up seeking perpetual protection.
Financial Sector Distortions
In reality, capital controls rarely have
been imposed in a well-thought-out way to
correct clearly deﬁned pre-existing distor-
tions.  Instead, capital controls most often
have been used as a tool to postpone difﬁ-
cult decisions on monetary and ﬁscal poli-
cies.  Recently, however, the case has been
made that capital controls may be the least
disadvantageous solution to the destabiliz-
ing effects of capital ﬂows on inadequately
regulated ﬁnancial systems.
Recall that when a country with a
ﬁxed-exchange rate has a net capital out-
ﬂow, the increase in relative demand for
foreign assets means that there is insufﬁ-
17The classic example of a tax
that improves welfare is the
one imposed on a polluting
industry.  Because a polluting
industry imposes non-market
costs on others, for which it
does not compensate them, a
government could improve
everyone’s well being if it were
to tax pollution.  The factory
would produce less pollution
and people would be happier.
The desire to meet employment
goals with an independent
monetary policy is really a ver-
sion of a “second best” story in
which the pre-existing distortion
is price inertia (or a similar fric-
tion) in the real economy that
causes monetary policy to have
real effects (Dooley, 1996). 
NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1999
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
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assets at the ﬁxed-exchange rate.  The
domestic monetary authorities may con-
duct contractionary monetary policy—
raise domestic interest rates to make their
assets more attractive—or lower the prices
of their goods and assets (devalue the cur-
rency).  This is a special case of a balance-
of-payments deﬁcit and presents the same
choice—to raise interest rates or devalue—
but in the case of a sudden capital outﬂow,
the crisis manifests itself in large sudden
capital outﬂows rather than more gradual
balance-of-payments pressures from other
causes.  Governments must choose
between high interest rates coupled with
some capital outﬂows or an exchange rate
devaluation that provokes fear of inﬂation
and policy instability leading to greater
capital outﬂows.  In either case, a serious
recession seems unavoidable.  
The recent case for capital controls
recognizes that a monetary contraction not
only slows economic activity through the
normal interest-rate channels, but also can
threaten the health of the economy through
the banking system (Kaminsky and Reinhart,
1999).  If the monetary authorities raise
interest rates, they increase the costs of funds
for banks and—by slowing economic
growth—reduce the demand for loans and
increase the number of nonperforming loans.
Choosing to devalue the currency rather than
raising interest rates does not necessarily
help banks either, as they may have bor-
rowed in foreign currency.  A devaluation
would increase the banks’ obligations to
their foreign creditors.  Thus, capital out-
ﬂows from the banking system pose spe-
cial problems for the monetary authorities,
as banks’ liabilities are usually implicitly or
explicitly guaranteed by the government.  
Indeed, the very nature of the ﬁnancial
system creates perverse incentives (distor-
tions) that international capital ﬂows often
exacerbate (Mishkin, 1998).  For example,
in a purely domestic context, banks have
incentives to make risky loans, as their
losses are limited to the owners’ equity
capital, but their potential proﬁts are
unlimited.  The existence of deposit insur-
ance worsens this problem by reducing
depositors’ incentive to monitor their banks’
loan portfolio for excessive risk.  Deposit
insurance, in turn, exists precisely because
depositors can not easily monitor the riskiness
of their banks.  In the absence of deposit
insurance, depositors would ﬁnd it difﬁ-
cult to tell good banks from bad banks and
would withdraw their money at any sign of
danger to the bank.  Once some depositors
began to withdraw their money from the
bank, all depositors would try to do so,
forcing the bank to close, even if its under-
lying assets were productive (Diamond and
Dybvig, 1983).  This puts the whole bank-
ing system at risk.  
To avoid this problem, most developed
countries combine implicit or explicit insur-
ance of bank deposits with government reg-
ulation of depository institutions, especially
their asset portfolios (loans).  In emerging
markets, however, banking regulation is
much more difﬁcult as the examiners are
less experienced, have fewer resources and
less strict accounting standards by which to
operate.  Thus, banking problems are more
serious in emerging markets.
Large international capital inﬂows,
especially short-term foreign borrowing,
can exacerbate these perverse incentives
and pose a real danger to banking systems.
Domestic banks often view borrowing from
abroad in foreign currency sources as a
low-cost source of funds—as long as the
domestic currency is not devalued.  With
this additional funding, banks expand into
unfamiliar areas, generating risky loans
that potentially create systemic risk to the
banking system (Eichengreen, 1999;
Garber, 1998; Goldstein, 1995; Dorn-
busch, 1998).  If capital outﬂows force a
devaluation, the foreign-currency denomi-
nated debts of the banking system increase
when measured in the domestic currency,
possibly leading to bank failures.  The
banking system is a particularly vulnerable
conduit by which capital ﬂows can desta-
bilize an economy because widespread
bank failures impose large costs on taxpay-
ers and can disrupt the payments system
and the relationships between banks and
ﬁrms who borrow from them (Friedman
and Schwartz, 1963; Bernanke, 1983).  The
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20difﬁculty of effective banking regulation cre-
ates an argument for capital controls as a
second-best solution to the existence of the
distorted incentives in the banking system.18
There are two ways in which capital
controls might be imposed to limit capital
ﬂow ﬂuctuations and achieve economic
stability.  First, capital controls may be
used to discourage capital outﬂows in the
event of a crisis—as Malaysia did in
September 1998—permitting looser
domestic monetary policy.  Controls on
outﬂows are ideally taken as a transitional
measure to buy time to achieve goals, as an
aid to reform rather than as a substitute
(Krugman, 1998).  Second, controls can
prevent destabilizing outﬂows by discourag-
ing or changing the composition of capital
inﬂows, as Chile did for most of the 1990s.
The second method—to discourage or
change the composition of capital inﬂows
with controls—requires some explanation.
A prime fear of those who seek to limit
capital ﬂows is that sudden outﬂows may
endanger economic stability because
investors are subject to panics, fads, and
bubbles (Kindleberger, 1978; Krugman,
1998; Wade and Veneroso, 1998).
Investors may panic because they, as indi-
viduals, have limited information about
the true value of the assets they are buying
or selling.  They can, however, infer infor-
mation from the actions of others.  For
example, one might assume that a crowd-
ed restaurant serves good food, even if one
has never eaten there.  In ﬁnancial mar-
kets, participants learn about other partici-
pants’ information by watching price
movements.  An increase in the price of an
asset might be interpreted as new informa-
tion that the asset had been underpriced,
for example.  Such a process might lead to
“herding” behavior, in which asset price
changes tend to cause further changes in
the same direction, creating a boom-bust
cycle and instability in ﬁnancial markets,
potentially justifying capital controls.  By
discouraging inﬂows of foreign capital,
governments can limit the pool of volatile
capital that may leave on short notice.  
Instead of limiting the total quantity of
capital inﬂows, some would argue that
changing the composition of that inﬂow is
just as important.  For example, it often is
claimed that direct investment is likely to
be more stable than portfolio investment
because stocks or bonds can be sold more
easily than real assets (like production
facilities) can be liquidated (Dixit and
Pindyck, 1994; Frankel and Rose, 1996;
Dornbusch, 1998).  In contrast, Garber
(1998) argues that tracking portfolio and
direct investment data may be misleading;
derivatives (options, futures, swaps, etc.)
can disguise the source of a crisis, making
it look like the source is excessive short-
term debt.  Goldstein (1995) says there is
little evidence that direct investment is less
“reversible” than portfolio investment. For
example, foreign ﬁrms with domestic pro-
duction facilities abroad can use those
facilities as collateral for bank loans that
then can be converted to assets in another
currency, effectively moving the capital
back out of the country.  
TYPES OF CAPITAL 
CONTROLS
To meet the many possible objectives
described for them, there are many types
of capital controls, distinguished by the
type of asset transaction they affect and
whether they tax the transaction, limit it,
or prohibit it outright.  This section distin-
guishes the many types of capital controls
by this taxonomy.
Capital controls are not, strictly speak-
ing, the same as exchange controls, the
restriction of trade in currencies, although the
two are closely related (Bakker, 1996).
Although currency and bank deposits are one
type of asset—money—exchange controls
may be used to control the current account
rather than the capital account.  For example,
by requiring importers to buy foreign
exchange from the government for a stated
purpose, exchange controls may be used to
prohibit the legal importation of “luxury”
goods, thereby rationing “scarce” foreign
exchange for more politically desirable
purposes.  So, while exchange controls are
inherently a type of limited capital control,
they are neither necessary to restrict capital
18The capital adequacy standards
of the Basle accords penalize
long-term international inter-
bank lending relative to short-
term lending, exacerbating the
problem (Corsetti, Pesenti, and
Roubini, 1998b).  Although
banks are important and heavi-
ly regulated almost every-
where, banks play an especially
important role in developing
countries because information
problems tend to be more
important in the developing
world than they are in the
developed world.
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to control capital account transactions. 
Controls on Inﬂows vs. Outﬂows
Capital controls on some long-term
(more than a year) inﬂows—direct invest-
ment and equity—often are imposed for
different reasons than those on short-term
inﬂows—bank deposits and money market
instruments.  While the recent trend has
been to limit short-term capital ﬂows
because of their allegedly greater volatility




MALAYSIA’S CAPITAL CONTROLS:  1998-99
The devaluation of the Thai baht in
July 1997 sparked signiﬁcant capital
outﬂows from Southeast Asia, leading
to a fall in local equity prices and
plunging exchange rates.  To counter
these outﬂows of capital, the IMF urged
many of the nations of the region to
raise interest rates, making their securi-
ties more attractive to international
investors.  Unfortunately, the higher
interest rates also slowed the domestic
economies.1
In response to this dilemma,
Malaysia imposed capital controls on
September 1, 1998.  The controls
banned transfers between domestic and
foreign accounts and between foreign
accounts, eliminated credit facilities to
offshore parties, prevented repatriation
of investment until September 1, 1999,
and ﬁxed the exchange rate at M3.8 per
dollar.  Foreign exchange transactions
were permitted only at authorized insti-
tutions and required documentation to
show they were for current account pur-
poses.  The government enacted a fairly
intrusive set of ﬁnancial regulations
designed to prevent evasion.  In
February 1999, a system of taxes on out-
ﬂows replaced the prohibition on repa-
triation of capital.  While the details are
complex, the net effect was to discour-
age short-term capital ﬂows but to freely
permit longer-term transactions
(Blustein, 1998).  By imposing the capi-
tal controls, Malaysia hoped to gain
some monetary independence, to be able
to lower interest rates without provok-
ing a plunge in the value of the currency
as investors ﬂed Malaysian assets. 
The Malaysian government and
business community claimed to be
pleased with the effect of the controls
in increasing demand and returning sta-
bility to the economy.  Even economists
who oppose capital controls believe
that they may have been of some use in
buying time to implement fundamental
reforms (Barro, 1998).  
Others fear, however, that the capi-
tal controls have replaced reform,
rather than buying time for reform.  As
of May 1999, the Malaysian govern-
ment does not appear to be using the
breathing space purchased by the capi-
tal controls to make fundamental
adjustments to its fragile and highly
leveraged ﬁnancial sector.  Rather,
Prime Minister Mahathir has sacked
policymakers who advocate reform
while aggressively lowering interest
rates, loosening nonperforming loan
classiﬁcation regulation and setting
minimum lending targets for banks.
This strategy may prove short-sighted,
as much of the capital outﬂow was
caused by the recognition that asset
prices were overvalued and the banking
sector was weak (Global Investor,
1998b).  Although monetary stimulus
may be helpful in the short run, it may
exacerbate the underlying problems.  In
addition, the government must be con-
cerned about the long-term impact that
the controls will have on investors’ will-
ingness to invest in the country.
1  For an overview of the causes and policy options in the Asian
ﬁnancial crisis, see Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1998a and
1998b).bans on long-term capital ﬂows often
reﬂect political sensitivity to foreign own-
ership of domestic assets.  For example,
Article 27 of the Mexican constitution lim-
its foreign investment in Mexican real
estate and natural resources.  
Controls on capital inﬂows and outﬂows
provide some slack for monetary policy discre-
tionunder ﬁxed exchange rates, but in oppo-
site directions.  Controls on capital inﬂows,
which allow for higher interest rates, have
been used to try to prevent an expansionof
the money supply and the accompanying
inﬂation, as were those of Germany in 1972-74
(Marston, 1995) or Chile during the 1990s.19
In contrast, controls on capital outﬂows permit
lower interest rates and higher money growth
than otherwise would be possible (Marston,
1995).  They most often have been used to
postpone a choice between devaluation or
tighter monetary policy, as they have beenin
Malaysia, for example (see the shaded insert).
Price vs. Quantity Controls
Capital controls also may be distin-
guished by whether they limit asset trans-
actions through price mechanisms (taxes)
or by quantity controls (quotas or outright
prohibitions).  Price controls may take the
form of special taxes on returns to interna-
tional investment (like the U.S. interest
equalization tax of the 1960s—see the
shaded insert), taxes on certain types of
transactions, or a mandatory reserve
requirement that functions as a tax.  
One type of price mechanism to dis-
courage short-term capital ﬂows is the
“Tobin” tax.  Proposed by Nobel laureate
James Tobin in 1972, the Tobin tax would
charge participants a small percentage of
all foreign exchange transactions (ul Haq,
Kaul and Grunberg, 1996; Kasa, 1999).
Advocates of such a tax hope that it would
diminish foreign exchange market volatility
by curtailing the incentive to switch posi-
tions over short horizons in the foreign
exchange market.  There are many prob-
lems with a Tobin tax, however.  The tax
might reduce liquidity in foreign exchange
markets or be evaded easily through deriv-
ative instruments.  It is uncertain who
would collect the tax or for what purposes
the revenue would be used.  And, most
dauntingly, a Tobin tax would have to be
enacted by widespread international agree-
ment to be successful.
A mandatory reserve requirementis a
price-based capital control that commonly
has been implemented to reduce capital
inﬂows.  Such a requirement typically oblig-
ates foreign parties who wish to deposit
money in a domestic bank account—or use
another form of inﬂow—to deposit some
percentage of the inﬂow with the central
bank for a minimum period.For example,
from 1991 to 1998, Chile required foreign
investors to leave a fraction of short-term
bank deposits with the central bank, earn-
ing no interest.20As the deposits earn no
interest and allow the central bank to buy
foreign money market instruments, the
reserve requirement effectively functions
as a tax on short-term capital inﬂows
(Edwards, 1998b).  See the shaded insert
on the Chilean encajeof the 1990s.  
Quantity restrictions on capital ﬂows
may include rules mandating ceilings or
requiring special authorization for new or
existing borrowing from foreign residents.
There may be administrative controls on
cross-border capital movements in which a
government agency must approve transac-
tions for certain types of assets.  Certain types
of investment might be restricted altogether
as in Korea, where the government has, until
recently, restricted long-term foreign invest-
ment (Eichengreen, et al. 1999).  Forbidding
or requiring special permission for repatria-
tion of proﬁts by foreign enterprises operat-
ing domestically may restrict capital outﬂows.
Capital controls may be more subtle:  Domes-
tic regulations on the portfolio choice of insti-
tutional investors also may be used as a type
of capital control, as they have been in Italy
and in South Korea in the past (Bakker, 1996;
Park and Song, 1996).  
EVALUATING CAPITAL  
CONTROLS
The conventional wisdom of the eco-
nomics profession has been—whatever the
problems with destabilizing capital ﬂows or
19Recall that capital inﬂows entail
foreign purchases of domestic
assets or foreign loans to
domestic residents while out-
ﬂows entail domestic purchases
of foreign assets or loans to for-
eign residents by domestic resi-
dents.  Under a ﬁxed exchange
rate, persistent capital inﬂows
will require an expansion of the
money supply or a revaluation
while substantial capital out-
ﬂows will require a contraction.
20The Chilean reserve require-
ment applied not only to bank
deposits but to many types of
capital inﬂows. 
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THE U.S. INTEREST EQUALIZATION TAX:  1963-74
During the late 1950s and early
1960s, the United States had both a
ﬁxed-exchange rate regime for the dol-
lar (the Bretton-Woods system) and
chronic pressures toward balance-of-
payments deﬁcits.  These strains result-
ed partly from the fact that interest
rates in the rest of the world—especial-
ly those in Europe—tended to be high-
er than those in the United States,
making foreign assets look attractive to
U.S. residents.1 Faced with the
unpalatable alternatives of devaluing
the dollar or conducting contractionary
policies, on July 19, 1963, President
Kennedy proposed the Interest
Equalization Tax (IET) to raise the
prices that Americans would have to
pay for foreign assets (Economist,
1964a).2
The IET imposed a variable sur-
charge, ranging from 1.05 percent on
one-year bills to 15 percent on equity
and bonds of greater than 28.5 years
maturity, on U.S. purchases of stocks
and bonds from Western Europe, Japan,
Australia, South Africa, and New
Zealand (Congressional Quarterly
Service, 1969).  Canada and the devel-
oping world were exempted from the
tax out of consideration for their spe-
cial dependence on U.S. capital mar-
kets.  By raising the prices of foreign
assets, it was hoped that demand for
those assets—and the consequent bal-
ance-of-payments deﬁcit—would be
reduced or eliminated.  
The IET reduced direct outﬂows to
the targeted countries but didn’t change
total outﬂows much because investors
were able to evade the tax through third
countries, like Canada (Pearce, 1995;
Kreinen, 1971; Stern, 1973).  In addi-
tion, because the tax did not cover
loans, investment was diverted initially
from bond and stock purchases to bank
loans.  Loans from American banks to
ﬁrms in Europe and Japan jumped from
$150 million during the ﬁrst half of
1963 to $400 million during the second
half (Economist, 1964b).  
To check bank loans to foreign
countries, the U.S. Congress enacted
the Voluntary Foreign Credit Restraint
Program (VFCRP) in February 1965,
broadening it in 1966 to limit U.S.
short-term capital outﬂows to other
developed countries.  In addition, U.S.
corporations were asked to voluntarily
limit their direct foreign investment.
The program was made mandatory in
1968 (Laffer and Miles, 1982; Kreinin,
1971).  U.S. capital controls were
relaxed in 1969 and phased out in
1974, after the United States left the
Bretton-Woods system of ﬁxed-exchange
rates (Congressional Quarterly Service,
1973a, 1973b, 1977).  
One unintended consequence of
the IET was the growth of foreign
ﬁnancial markets—at the expense of
U.S. markets—as they inherited the job
of intermediating international capital
ﬂows.  For example, the volume of
international borrowing in London rose
from $350 million in 1962 to more
than $1 billion in 1963 while the vol-
ume of foreign ﬂotations in New York
fell from $2 billion in the ﬁrst half of
1963 to just over $600 million in the
next nine months (Economist, 1964b). 
1 At this time, the United States had a current account surplus that
failed to fully offset private demand for foreign assets—the capi-
tal account deﬁcit—resulting in the need for temporary mea-
sures to close the gap. 
2 In August 1964, the U.S. Congress enacted this tax, making it
retroactive to the date it was proposed.NOVEMBER/DECEMBER1999
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CHILE’S ENCAJE:  1991-98
During the late 1980s and early 1990s,
international capital began to return to Chile as
a result of slow growth and low interest rates in
the developed world and sound macroeconomic
policies, including reduced debt, in Chile
(Edwards, 1998a).  The Chilean authorities
feared that these capital inﬂows would compli-
cate monetary policy decisions—perhaps caus-
ing real appreciation of the exchange rate—and
they also were wary of the danger of building up
short-term debt.  
Chile had long restricted capital ﬂows and
these limits were updated in the early 1990s to
deal with the surge in capital inﬂows.  Direct
investment was made subject to a 10-year stay
requirement in 1982; this period was reduced to
three years in 1991 and to one-year in 1993.
Portfolio ﬂows were made subject to the
encaje—a one-year, mandatory, non-interest pay-
ing deposit with the central bank—created in
1991 to regulate capital inﬂows.1 The encaje was
initially 20 percent but was increased to 30 per-
cent in 1992.  The penalty for early withdrawal
was 3 percent.2
The effect of the encaje was to tax foreign
capital inﬂows, with short-term ﬂows being
taxed much more heavily than long-term ﬂows.
For example, consider the choice of an
American buying a one-year discount bond with
a face value of 10,000 pesos for a price of 9,091
pesos, or a 10-year discount bond with the same
face value and a price of 3,855 pesos.  Either
bond, if held to maturity, would yield a 10 per-
cent per annum return.3 In the presence of a 30
percent one-year reserve requirement, however,
the one-year bond’s annual yield would be 7.7
percent and the 10-year bond’s annual yield
would be 9.7 percent.  Hence, the encaje acted as
a graduated tax on capital inﬂows.  
Researchers disagree about the effectiveness
of Chile’s capital controls.  Valdes and Soto
(1996) concluded that they changed the compo-
sition but not the magnitude of the inﬂows.  In
other words, investors substituted from heavily
taxed short-term ﬂows to more lightly taxed
long-term inﬂows.  They also found that the
controls were ineffective in preventing a real
appreciation of the exchange rate.  Larraín B.,
Labán M., and Chumacero (1997) studied the
same issue with different methods and found
that, although there was considerable substitu-
tion in the short run, the controls did change the
magnitude of the inﬂows in the long run.  
There is even more disagreement about
whether the capital controls were important in
keeping Chile insulated from the Asian crisis.
Many observers have cited Chile’s capital con-
trols in advocating more widespread restrictions
on capital controls for other developing coun-
tries (Bhagwati, 1998).  Edwards (1998a), on
the other hand, points out that Chile also had
substantial capital controls during the late 1970s
and early 1980s, before its major banking crisis
that cost Chileans more than 20 percent of GDP
during 1982-83.  The major difference between
then and now is that Chile now has a modern
and efﬁcient system of banking regulation.
Others credit the participation of foreign banks
in strengthening the Chilean banking system by
providing experience and sophistication in
assessing risks and making loans.  At the time of
the crisis, Chile had a high percentage of domes-
tic loans from foreign-owned banks—20 per-
cent, about the same as the United States and far
higher than South Korea, Thailand, and
Indonesia (5 percent) (Economist, 1997).  In
addition, Edwards (1998a) claims that the encaje
harmed the domestic ﬁnancial services industry
and the small ﬁrms that could not borrow long
term on international markets to avoid the tax.
If Chile’s capital controls helped, it was to buy
time for structural reforms and effective ﬁnan-
cial regulation.
1 The word encaje means “strongbox” in Spanish. 
2 The encaje was reduced to 10 percent and the early withdrawal
penalty from 3 percent to 1 percent in June 1998.  The encaje was
eliminated entirely on September 16, 1998 (Torres, 1998). 
3 The yield to maturity on a bond equates the initial outlay with the
present discounted value of its payoffs.  The yields on the bonds are
determined by solving the following equations fori:  
9091 = 10,000/(1+i), 3855 = 10,000/(1+i)10, 
1.3*9091 = .3*9091/(1+i)+10,000/(1+i) and 
1.3*3855 = .3*3855/(1+i) + 10,000/(1+i)10.ﬁxed exchange rates—that capital controls
are ineffective and impose substantial costs
on economies that outweigh any beneﬁts.
That generalization ignores distinctions
among types of capital controls and varied
criteria for success, however.  Capital con-
trols have many potential purposes and
thus many potential standards by which to
judge their efﬁcacy.  Difﬁculties in separat-
ing the effects of capital controls from the
balance of payments or capital ﬂow prob-
lems they were intended to alleviate com-
plicates the empirical study of the effects of
capital controls (Johnston and Tamirisa,
1998).  Also, generalizing about the effec-
tiveness of capital controls from one coun-
try—or even one period—to another is
risky because the effectiveness of capital
controls depends on the rigor with which
they are enforced (Obstfeld and Taylor,
1998).  Governments that control substan-
tial aspects of their citizens’ lives (e.g.,
Cuba) ﬁnd it easier to enforce controls on
trade in assets (Minton, 1999).
Are Capital Controls Effective?
Keeping in mind these difﬁculties,
there are several possible ways to gauge the
effectiveness of capital controls.  Perhaps
the most direct way is to measure whether
the imposition of capital controls changes
the magnitude or composition of capital
ﬂows, using some assumption about what
ﬂows would have been without the capital
controls.  Measuring the composition of
capital ﬂows always has been difﬁcult,
however, and it has become more so since the
advent of derivatives that can be used to
disguise capital ﬂows.  For example, a U.S.
firm may build a production facility in Mexico
but hedge the risk that the peso will decline—
reducing the dollar value of the invest-
ment—by buying put options on the peso,
which will increase in value if the peso
falls.21 The direct investment will be mea-
surable as an inﬂow, but the corresponding
outﬂow—the put contract to potentially
sell pesos—may not be (Garber, 1998).
If capital controls are designed to per-
mit monetary autonomy, one can examine
the extent to which onshore interest
rates—subject to capital controls—differ
from those found in offshore markets or
domestic currency returns on foreign
assets.  Such tests assume that returns on
comparable investments in the same cur-
rency should be equal in the absence of
effective capital controls.  To the extent
that they differ, the capital controls are
effective (Harberger, 1980; Edwards,
1998b).  This research has shown that cap-
ital controls have been able to create mod-
est “wedges” of one to several percentage
points between returns on similar domes-
tic and international assets (Marston,
1995).22 A related test to determine mone-
tary autonomy is to measure the effective-
ness of sterilization in preventing an
appreciation of the real exchange rate.
Generally, controls on inﬂows have
been found to be more effective than those
on outﬂows because there is less incentive
to evade controls on inﬂows (Reinhart and
Smith, 1998; Eichengreen, et al. 1999).23
Evading controls on inﬂows ordinarily will
provide only marginal beneﬁts for foreign
investors, as the expected risk-adjusted
domestic return usually will be compara-
ble to that on alternative international
investments.  On the other hand, in the
event of an expected devaluation, there is
enormous incentive to avoid such a loss by
evading controls on capital outﬂows.  The
expected loss on holding domestic assets
can be several hundred percent in annual-
ized terms over a short horizon.  For
example, if one expects the Malaysian
ringgit to be devalued 10 percent in one
week, the expected continuously com-
pounded annual return associated with
holding the currency through such a
devaluation is almost –550 percent.24
Therefore, researchers like Obstfeld (1998)
and Eichengreen (1999) have found the
idea of preventing destabilizing outﬂows
by limiting inﬂows to be more promising
than directly trying to stop outﬂows.
In sum, the consensus of the research
on capital controls has been that they can
alter the composition of capital ﬂows or
drive a small, permanent wedge between
domestic and offshore interest rates but
they cannot indeﬁnitely sustain inconsis-
21An (American) put option con-
fers on the holder the right, but
not the obligation, to sell a
speciﬁed quantity of pesos at a
speciﬁed price, called the strike
price or exercise price, on or
before a given date. 
22Fieleke (1994) ﬁnds that capi-
tal controls were of very limited
effectiveness in creating inter-
est differentials during the
European Monetary System
crises of 1992-93. 
23As will be discussed in the next
subsection, capital controls
often are evaded by changing
from prohibited to permitted
assets or by falsifying invoices
for traded goods. 
24The continuously compounded
annual return is computed from
52* ln(.9/1).
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26tent policies, and their effectiveness tends
to erode over time as consumers and ﬁrms
become better at evading the controls
(Marston, 1995).  Outﬂow restrictions, in
particular, may buy breathing space, but
that is all.  There are more researchers will-
ing to defend inﬂow restrictions, however.
Eichengreen (1999) argues that, to restrain
inﬂows, controls do not have to be perfect,
they just need to make avoidance costly
enough to reduce destabilizing ﬂows.
How Are Capital Controls Evaded?
Over time, consumers and ﬁrms real-
ize that they can evade capital controls
through the channels used to permit trade
in goods.  Firms, for example, may evade
controls on capital ﬂows by falsifying
invoices for traded goods; they apply to
buy or sell more foreign exchange than the
transaction calls for.  For example, a
domestic ﬁrm wishing to evade limits on
capital inﬂows might claim that it export-
ed $10 million worth of goods when it
only, in fact, exported $9 million.  It may
use the excess $1 million to invest in
domestic assets and split the proceeds with
the foreign ﬁrm providing the capital.  
Perhaps the most common method to
evade controls on capital ﬂows is through
“leads and lags” in which trading ﬁrms
hasten or delay payments for imports or
exports (Einzig, 1968).  To evade controls
on outﬂows, for example, importers pay
early for imports (leads), in exchange for a
discount, and exporters allow delayed pay-
ments for their goods (lags), in return for a
higher payment.  This permits importers
and exporters to effectively lend money to
the rest of the world, a capital outﬂow.  To
evade controls on inﬂows, importers delay
payments while exporters demand acceler-
ated payments.  Thus, leads and lags permit
trade credit to substitute for short-term
capital ﬂows.  Governments often attempt
to close the leads/lags loophole on short-
term capital ﬂows with administrative con-
trols on import/export ﬁnancing.  
Travel allowances for tourists are
another method by which capital controls
may be evaded (Bakker, 1996).  More
recently, ﬁnancial innovation has spawned
ﬁnancial instruments—derivatives—that
may be used to mislead banking and ﬁnan-
cial regulators to evade prudential regula-
tion and/or capital controls (Garber,
1998).  For example, derivatives may con-
tain clauses that change payouts in the
event of defaults or the imposition of
exchange controls (Garber, 1998).
Improvements in information technology
make it easier to buy and sell assets and
reduce the effectiveness of capital controls
(Eichengreen, et al. 1999).  
Capital controls also induce substitu-
tion from prohibited to permitted assets
(Goldstein, 1995).  So, for example, the
U.S. interest equalization tax was evaded
through trade in assets with Canada while
heavy Chilean taxes on short-term inﬂows
may have induced a (desired) substitution
to more lightly taxed longer-term inﬂows
(Valdes, 1998).  Capital controls have been
more successful in changing the composi-
tion of asset trade than the volume. 
Costs of Capital Controls
Although they often are evaded success-
fully, capital controls nonetheless impose
substantial costs in inhibiting international
trade in assets.  Foremost among these costs
are limiting the beneﬁts of capital ﬂows as
described in Section 2: risk-sharing, diver-
siﬁcation, growth, and technology transfer
(Global Investor, 1998a).  Capital export-
ing countries see a lower return on their
savings while capital importers receive less
investment and grow more slowly with
capital controls.  Krugman (1998) argues
that capital controls do the most harm
when they are used to defend inconsistent
policies that produce an overvalued cur-
rency—a currency that would tend to
depreciate or be devalued in the absence of
the controls.  This attempt to free govern-
ments from the discipline of the market
permits poor or inconsistent policies to be
maintained longer than they otherwise
would, increasing the costs of these policies. 
Poorly designed or administered capi-
tal controls often adversely affect direct
investment and the ordinary ﬁnancing of
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27trade deals (Economist, 1998).  Controls
can even worsen the problem of destabiliz-
ing capital ﬂows.  For example, the Korean
government has acknowledged that the
restriction on offshore borrowing by
Korean corporations contributed to its bal-
ance of payments and banking crises in
1997 (Global Investor, 1998a).  The cor-
ruption created by evasion and the admin-
istrative costs of controls also is an
unintended cost of the controls.  Even as
the costs accumulate and their original
purpose has ended, capital controls, like
any regulation, develop their own con-
stituencies and become difﬁcult to phase
out.  The resumption of free capital ﬂows
does not always end the costs of capital
controls.  Speciﬁcally, blocking the depar-
ture of capital temporarily subsidizes
investment but raises the perception of
risk, increasing a risk premium and/or
deterring future investment (Economist,
1998; Goldstein, 1995).  
Partly because the costs of capital con-
trols are serious and tend to worsen over
time, economists have suggested attacking
problems at their source rather than with
capital controls (Krugman, 1998; Mishkin,
1998).  For example, to cope with banks’
incentive to take on excessive risk, a gov-
ernment might concentrate on reforming
and strengthening the domestic ﬁnancial
structure—especially regulations on foreign
borrowing—as it slowly phases out capital
controls to derive the beneﬁts of capital
flows (Goldstein, 1995).25Or, to ﬁght a real
appreciation brought on by a capital inﬂow,
a government might conduct contractionary
ﬁscal policy.  In all circumstances, better
macroeconomic policy is needed to avoid
ﬁnancial crises, such as those that affected
Asia in 1997.  Countries must eschew over-
valued currencies, excessive foreign debt,
and unsustainable consumption.
CONCLUSION
Recently, a number of opinion leaders,
including some prominent economists,
have suggested that developing countries
should reconsider capital controls.  This
article has reviewed the issues associated
with capital controls.  Controls most often
have been used to permit more freedom
for monetary policy during balance of pay-
ments crises in the context of ﬁxed
exchange rates.  Restrictions on inﬂows
have been implemented to prevent real
appreciation of the exchange rate or to
correct other pre-existing distortions, like
the incentives for ﬁnancial institutions to
take excessive risk.  Although controls on
capital ﬂows may change the composition
of ﬂows, they impose substantial costs on
the economy and cannot be used to indeﬁ-
nitely sustain inconsistent policies.  Under
most circumstances, it is better to attack
the source of the distortion or inconsistent
policy at the source rather than treating
symptoms through capital controls.
Although the worst of the Asian ﬁnan-
cial crisis seems to be over, it—like the peso
crisis of December 1994—has been a sober-
ing lesson in the volatility of capital ﬂows
and the fragility of emerging market ﬁnan-
cial systems.  It also has raised questions
for future research:  Are limits on capital
inﬂows the best solution to protecting
domestic ﬁnancial systems from the distor-
tions inherent in banking?  What is the
proper sequence for economic reforms of
the capital account, the current account,
and the banking system? 
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